Touch Screen Recount Procedures + Security Recommendations

2005 Wisconsin Act 92 describes, among other things, recount procedures to be used with electronic voting machines. Try to imagine this procedure in actual practice such as that which occurred during the recent school board recount:

(4) If a valid petition for a recount is filed under s.9.01 in an election at which an electronic voting system was used to record and tally the votes cast, each party to the recount may designate one or more persons who are authorized to receive access to the software components that were used to record and tally the votes in the election. The board shall grant access to the software components to each designated person if, before receiving access, the person enters into a written agreement with the board that obligates the person to exercise the highest degree of reasonable care to maintain the confidentiality of all proprietary information to which the person is provided access, unless otherwise permitted in a contract entered into under sub. (5).
(5) A county or municipality may contract with the vendor of an electronic voting system to permit a greater degree of access to software components used with the system that is required under sub. (4).

Really builds voter confidence, eh?

Meanwhile when the State Elections Board approved the use of the Diebold touch screen machines, they also approved five security recommendations:

1. Memory cards shall have a permanent serial number assigned.
2. Once a memory card is programmed for an election, it should be immediately inserted into its assigned unit and sealed with a serialized, tamper-evident seal.
3. The municipality should maintain a written log that records which memory cards and which serialized tamper-evident seals are assigned to which units.
4. Prior to any ballots being cast on any unit, the integrity of the tamper-evident seal must be verified by the chief election inspector before opening the compartment containing the memory card and unit power switch.
5. The municipal clerk should maintain a written log that records the chain of custody of each memory card and unit from the point of programming the memory card for use in the election through the official canvass.

Imagine a recount in which any one or more of the security recommendations were not followed properly? Would the public have confidence that the final outcome was the correct one? I think not.